March
2005
Tax dollars keep the inner
city dream alive
Our last editorial pointed out
that a crucial difference between Labor and the conservative
parties is that the ALP’s policies and pronouncements are out of
kilter with (well to the left of) the views of Labor voters on
many issues, whereas those of the Coalition much more closely
reflect the views of their supporters – indeed, all too often of
Labor supporters as well (see Katherine Betts's research in
People and Parliamentarians).
This is not an argument for
automatically aligning party policy with public – or even Labor
voters’ – opinion, which may sometimes be ill-informed. Good
government frequently demands holding unpopular positions and
taking unpopular decisions, and the Howard government deserves
harsh criticism for its persistent failures on this account.
On the other hand, it not only
makes electoral sense – it is also in an important sense
democratically honourable – to start with the presumption that
the public have got it right. Take public spending and the size
of government.
Labor aspires to represent
ordinary people and the disadvantaged, where necessary at the
expense of the wealthy and the powerful. Consider how these two
constituencies typically live their lives: the former are
generally modest and frugal, the latter all too often reckless
and extravagant. Yet the spending policies of their respective
“natural” parties are usually characterised (fairly or not) in
opposite terms.
When Labor goes to the polls
offering grandiose plans and big spending initiatives –
particularly on “social capital” – it grates with many of our
supporters. We have to be careful with our own money, they
argue, but “our” party is profligate with our taxes. To make
matters worse, they say, our taxes are often squandered on
“social engineering” initiatives that are at odds with our
values.
Fiscal prudence, we contend,
should be a foundation Labor value, like compassion and sympathy
for the underdog. There are a number of points worth making
here.
First, we need to understand
that expenditure is the obverse of taxation. To a person, Labor
supporters oppose regressive taxation – taxes that fall
disproportionately on the relatively poor – as also “tax
expenditures” (rebates and deductions) that favour the rich. But
Labor activists are often unwilling to apply the same logic to
public spending: they refuse to acknowledge the extent to which
many of their most cherished spending initiatives (university
education is a classic example) disproportionately benefit
well-off individuals and communities. In many cases the benefits
are doubly regressive: for example, a new inner city public park
that enhances local amenity also raises the area’s property
values, thereby making it even harder for the less affluent to
move in.
Second, economists well
recognise that fiscal restraint can be traded off against
monetary restraint: if budget deficits are lowered (or surpluses
increased), there is less pressure on interest rates. Rising
interest rates cost jobs and reduce most people’s disposable
income, which hit the less well off hardest.
Third, research we previously
undertook demonstrates that at least since the early 1990s there
has been a clear and strong correlation across Australia between
the average individual income of residents in a local government
area (LGA) and the proportion of employed persons in that LGA
who had public sector jobs. Public employment, on this evidence,
is no longer primarily a career path for ordinary working
people, much less a safety net for the disadvantaged. On the
contrary, it has become the well-worn path to comfort and
security for tertiary-educated professionals.
The following tables, based on
the 1991 census, present our research in this regard:
Income
range (employed persons) |
Number
of LGAs with above national average proportion of
public employment |
|
NSW/ACT |
Vic |
Qld |
SA |
WA |
Tas |
NT |
Aust |
Lowest fifth for
State |
14 |
6 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
7 |
60 |
Next fifth for
State |
19 |
24 |
33 |
4 |
6 |
2 |
10 |
98 |
Middle fifth for
State |
31 |
24 |
37 |
7 |
9 |
6 |
11 |
125 |
Next fifth for
State |
48 |
26 |
48 |
14 |
15 |
6 |
12 |
169 |
Highest fifth for
State |
41 |
19 |
34 |
19 |
9 |
9 |
9 |
140 |
Income range (employed
persons) |
Number of
LGAs with below national average proportion of public
sector employment |
|
NSW/ACT |
Vic |
Qld |
SA |
WA |
Tas |
NT |
Aust |
Lowest fifth for State |
41 |
41 |
59 |
24 |
26 |
9 |
4 |
204 |
Next fifth for State |
36 |
22 |
51 |
21 |
22 |
11 |
2 |
165 |
Middle fifth for State |
24 |
23 |
48 |
19 |
19 |
6 |
0 |
139 |
Next fifth for State |
7 |
20 |
36 |
11 |
13 |
7 |
0 |
94 |
Highest fifth for
State |
14 |
28 |
51 |
6 |
19 |
4 |
2 |
124 |
These figures show that (apart
from the top income quintile, which swaps places with the second
from the top), the higher the proportion of public sector
workers in a particular LGA, the wealthier the employed
residents are on average; conversely, the higher the proportion
of private sector workers, the poorer they are. The correlation
is strong nationally and across all states and territories.
It is worth comparing these
tables with findings in the ABS's Sydney: A Social Atlas,
that "suburbs with high percentages of low income households
were primarily concentrated in the west and outer west, in a
band north of the Georges River and south of the Parramatta
River extending south-west to Campbelltown and west to Penrith".
Conversely, "areas with the highest percentages of high income
households were located around the waterways of Sydney,
especially the Sydney Harbour foreshores …" Unsurprisingly,
according to the Social Atlas, "the distribution of people with
university qualifications was similar to the distribution of
high income households …"
While public sector employment
has increasingly become the preserve of inner suburban
university graduates, low and middle income earners have to face
the rigours of life in the private sector market economy. The
fact that this experience shapes their values may elude Labor,
but it is not lost on the Coalition.
Voters are human: their votes
can be “bought” by spending initiatives targeted to their values
and their circumstances. (John Howard is the master practitioner
in this respect.) But the experience of the Hawke government in
the mid-1980s showed that restraint and sacrifice, equitably
applied and honestly explained, need not be an electoral
handicap. On the contrary, we believe that the extent to which
Labor succeeds in identifying itself with expenditure restraint
and smaller government, combined with close attention to the
“equity impact” of public spending initiatives, will largely
determine the party's longer term election prospects.
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